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Sovereignty: The State, the Individual,
and the International Legal System in the
Twenty First Century
BY RONALD A. BRAND*
Sovereignty denotes independence. A sovereign state is one that
acknowledges no superior power over its own government.'
The word sovereignty is ambiguous .... We propose to waste no
time in chasing shadows, and will therefore discard the word
entirely.
[P]olitical philosophy must eliminate Sovereignty both as a word
3and as a concept ....
Away with the "S" word!
4
Introduction
The concept of sovereignty has come to mean different things to
different persons. The inextricable link between sovereignty and
international law means that the existing multiple definitions of
sovereignty affect both the role of the state and the rights of the
individual in international law. Conversely, developments in
international law necessarily require the reassessment of our
* Professor of Law and Director, Center for International Legal Education,
University of Pittsburgh. The material in this essay builds on earlier work of the
author found at Ronald A. Brand, External Sovereignty and International Law, 18
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1685 (1995). Excellent research assistance was provided by
Scott Jablonski.
'JEREMY RABKIN, WHY SOVEREIGNTY MATTERS 2 (1998).
2
ROLAND R. FOULKE, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 69 (1920).
3Jacques Maritain, The Concept of Sovereignty, 44 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 343, 343
(1950).
4Louis Henkin, Notes from the President, AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. NEWSL. (ASIL,
Washington, D.C.), Mar. 1993, at 1.
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understanding of sovereignty and the definitions we apply to that
term.
In its origins, the concept of sovereignty dealt with the
relationship between the individual and the "sovereign." Its
application to the role of the state in international law developed as a
secondary matter, bringing with it discussions of relationships
between "sovereign" states. In the twenty-first century, it is time to
return to the concept's original focus on the individual. The
development of international law in this century is likely to be framed
and judged not so much by the way international law defines
relationships between states as by the way it deals with relationships
between persons and states.
The thesis of this essay is that an understanding of original
concepts of sovereignty both helps explain twentieth century
developments in international law and provides a proper context for
coming changes in the ways in which persons relate to states, states
relate to states within the international legal system, and ultimately-
and most importantly-the way international law affects and applies
to persons. A corollary to this need to properly understand concepts
of sovereignty is the belief that the most important developments in
international law in the new century will not be in state-state
relationships but rather in the status and rights of the person in
international law. In the twentieth century, the process of
globalization in many ways brought us back to the importance of the
individual in determining both what sovereignty is and its proper
exercise by those acting on behalf of states.
In this essay, I propose first to review the original meaning of the
term "sovereignty." I will then provide examples of twentieth
century developments in the application of international law to
individuals and the application of municipal law to states. These
examples demonstrate that international law has moved beyond
contemporary notions of sovereignty, that concerns about "giving up
sovereignty" through participation in multilateral organizations often
are misplaced, and that the ultimate propriety of new international
norms will in many cases be determined by the manner in which they
deal with relationships between individuals and the state-which is
the relationship addressed by the original concept of sovereignty.
1L Original Concepts of Sovereignty
Sovereignty is a concept of Western political and philosophical
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thought. While one may question whether in today's world it is
appropriate to consider such a concept without recognition of the
influence of other parts of the world, it is nonetheless a fact that
international law as we know it is also a product of Western thought.
Thus, when we discuss sovereignty, and when we discuss international
law, we begin with an inherent connection to Western philosophies
and the development of Western culture, even though today no single
culture or group of cultures can be considered without attention to
the broader global context.
In the middle ages, Western concepts of sovereignty had no
relationship to territory. Humanity found its "oneness" not in human
rulers or the geographic reaches of their power but rather in the
Respublica Christiana, the pervasive unity of God (jus divinum),
"Sovereignty, in the sense of an ultimate territorial organ which
knows no superior, was to the middle ages an unthinkable thing."6
The sovereignty of God (in the Western context of the Christian-
Roman Catholic-faith) took earthly form in the person of the Pope.
Thus it could be said that "[jnfallibility in the spiritual order and
sovereignty in the temporal order are two perfectly synonymous
words."'
The concept of a singular Respublica Christiana was destroyed by
the Reformation and replaced by the notion of state supremacy, in
which the sovereign "ceases to think of superiority as existent outside
itself."'  Jean Bodin, the "father of the modern theory of
5HAROLD J. LASKI, THE FOUNDATIONS OF SOVEREIGNTY AND OTHER ESSAYS 2
(1921). See also Helmut Steinberger, Sovereignty, in 10 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 397, 398-400 (1987) (discussing Universitas Christiana).
6LASKI, supra note 5, at 1.
7
BRIAN TIERNEY, ORIGINS OF PAPAL INFALLIBILITY 1 (1972) (translation of quotation
from JOSEPH DE MAISTRE, DU PAPE 27 (1817) ("L'infaillibilitg dans l'ordre spirituel
et la souverainetg dans l'ordre temporel, sont deux mots parfaitement synonymes.")).
Tierney goes on to contest this statement by de Maistre:
The words "infallibility" and "sovereignty" do not have the same meaning.
It would be more true to suggest that the ideas they express are intrinsically
incompatible with one another. It is of the essence of sovereignty (as the
concept was understood both in the nineteenth century and in the Middle
Ages) that a sovereign ruler cannot be bound by the acts of his predecessors.
It is of the essence of infallibility (as the doctrine was formulated at Vatican
Council I) that the infallible decrees of one pope are binding on all his
successors since they are, by definition irreformable.
Id. at 2. Tierney then goes on to discuss the problems that subsequent Popes had in
dealing with the "infallible" pronouncements of their predecessors.
8LASKI, supra note 5, at 12.
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sovereignty," 9 wrote that "Majestie or Soveraigntie is the most high,
absolute, and perprtual power over the citisens and subjects in a
Commonweale."'' But for Bodin, the sovereignty of the king over his
subjects remained submissive to "the law of God and nature.""
"Bodin's sovereign was subject only to Natural Law, and to no human
law whatsoever, as distinct from Natural Law, and that [was] the core
of political absolutism."'2 Thus, notions of sovereignty incorporated
concepts of abstract moral rights that placed limits on sovereign
power.
In later theory, the sovereignty of the king became absolute, and
this sovereignty became equated with the sovereignty of the state.
3
this transition, however, did not always provide perfect parallelism of
thought. While in the Respublica Christiana there had been room for
only one universal power, the territorial concept of kings and states
required compartmentalization of sovereignty. Sovereignty existed
within a given territory and resulted in the need to express the
concept of multiple sovereigns, which was intellectually inconsistent
with the sacred origins of the term.
While the word "sovereign" had at times been employed to mean
"any official endowed with superior authority,"'4 the king's right to
supreme power, unlimited by any other earthly authority, took hold:
[T]he idea prevailed that the king as a person possessed a natural
and inalienable right to rule his subjects from above. Once the
9Maritain, supra note 3, at 344.
'"1d. at 345 n.13 (translation of quotation from JEAN BODIN, DE LA RI PUBLIQUE Bk.
1, ch. 8 (Richard Knolles trans., London, Impensis G. Bishop 1606) (1583)). Bodin
was born in 1530 and died in 1596.
"Id. at 344 (translation of quotation from BODIN, supra note 10, at Bk. 1, ch. 8).
"Id. at 344 n.lla.
Bodin remained to some extent tributary to the Middle Ages, and did not go
the full distance of the road later traversed by Hobbes and Austin. But if he
made the Sovereign bound to respect the jus gentium and the constitutional
law of monarchy (leges imperii), this was because (when it came to such
things as the inviolability of private property, or the precepts of jus gentium,
or the "laws of the realm" such as the Salic law, expressing the basic
agreement in which the power of the Prince originates) human laws and
tribunals were only enforcing Natural Law itself, so that, as a result, their
pronouncements were valid even with regard to the Sovereign.
Id.
"3"The concept of Sovereignty took definite form at the moment when absolute
monarchy was budding in Europe. No corresponding notion had been used in the
Middle Ages with regard to political authority." Id. at 348.
4Id. at 348 n.29.
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people had agreed upon the fundamental law of the kingdom, and
given the king and his descendants power over them, they were
deprived of any right to govern themselves, and the natural right to
govern the body politic resided henceforth in full only in the person
of the king. Thus the king had a right of supreme power which was
natural and inalienable ....
The king, originally as the vicar of God, was not only the highest
earthly power, but also above the highest power, existing separately
from the body politic.
The idea that states inherited this notion of sovereignty that
existed between the divine king and his subjects took form in the
work of Hobbes, who wrote of "he that carryeth this Person, [who] is
called Soveraigne, and said to have Soveraigne Power: and every one
besides, his Subject."16 Hobbes saw the sovereign king as the means
by which society escapes from the "miserable condition of war" that
otherwise results from each person's focus on getting as large a share
of scarce resources as possible while preventing others from doing
so. 17 Thus citizens enter a mutual covenant to confer upon the
sovereign "all our power and strength," and "submit [our] wills, every
one to his will and [our] judgments, to his judgments," so that "he
may use the strength and means of [us] all as he shall think expedient,
for [our] peace and common defence."'8  The sovereign's role in
international relations was a natural extension of this arrangement for
peace and security at home. The sovereign must:
be Judge both of the meanes of Peace and Defence, and also of the
hindrances, and disturbances of the same; and.., do whatsoever he
shall think necessary to be done, both before-hand, (for preserving
of peace and security, by prevention of Discord at home, and
Hostility from abroad); and, when Peace and Security are lost, for
the recovery of the same.'9
Thus, the sovereign's role is to provide security through peace and
common defense.
It has become routine to hear of the "sovereignty of states," but
this clearly is a comparatively recent development in the use of a term
SId. at 348.
"6THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, Pt. II, ch. xvii, [14]. Hobbes was born in 1588 and
died in 1679, publishing Leviathan in 1651.
'71d. at Pt. II, ch. xvii, T [1].
"Id. at Pt. II, ch. xvii, [13].
'91d. at Pt. II, ch. xviii, [8].
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that dealt first with absolute religious authority and then with the
power and obligations of kings. When the church was synonymous
with any idea of state or sovereign and when the king later occupied a
similar role, the connection had clear ties to the origin of the term.
Those ties have diminished, however, as the distance between original
concepts and current usage has grown. Nonetheless,
Since the seventeenth century the state has been recognized as the
supreme power within a defined juridical border. This ended both
the Church's transnational claims to political authority and the
overlapping jurisdictions of nobles, kings, and clerics that
characterized the late medieval system.... State sovereignty-
institutional authority within a set of clearly demarcated
boundaries-is self-justifying; historical possession legitimates
continued jurisdiction. In much of Europe, its origins can be traced
to the legal titles and dynastic ties that provided monarchs with a
claim to the territory that eventually provided the basis for the
modern state.20
This concept of the state as supreme power (i.e., the "sovereign")
within its territory2' brought with it an understanding that within the
international order states are co-equal in their authority,' and that
states must consent to rules that will bind them in their conduct.'
Thus the concept of state sovereignty has become embedded in
the international legal system. In this process, we have continued to
use the term to refer to authority, but this authority is no longer
absolute in its breadth (it exists only within the territory of the state),
20j. Samuel Barkin & Bruce Cronin, The State and the Nation: Changing Norms and
the Rules of Sovereignty in International Relations, 48 INT'L ORG. 107, 111 (1994).
2'See 2 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 511 cmt. b (1987) (noting
the territorial element of sovereignty on land as well as over territorial seas).
'The era of equal sovereigns in the form of states dates from the 1555 Peace of
Augsburg, becoming more formalized with the 1648 Peace of Westphalia. Some
commentators have distinguished different "types" of sovereignty, referring to one
type as "Westphalian-sovereignty," and defining it as "an institutional arrangement
for organizing political life that is based on two principles: territoriality and the
exclusion of external actors from domestic authority structures.... Westphalian
sovereignty is violated when external actors influence or determine domestic
authority structures." STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED
HYPOCRISY 20 (1999).
23"Specific rules of law.., depend on state acceptance. Particular agreements create
binding obligations for the particular parties, but general law depends on general
acceptance." 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW 18 (1987) (pt. I,
ch. 1, Intro. note). The concept of state consent is fundamental to the sources of law
as stated in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.
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nor is it absolute in its depth (it has limits created both by consent and
by jus cogens norms). A concept originally used to describe the
relationship between mankind and the creator, evolved through the
Middle Ages and the Reformation along with the development of the
nation-state to describe the relationship between the king and the
citizen, and now is used to describe a state's attributes in its
relationships with other states in the international legal order.
"Sovereign" states relate to one another within the framework of
international law, developing binding norms through written
agreement and unwritten but consistent and intended conduct. The
word "sovereignty" still connotes a strong sense of authority.
However, this notion of authority no longer is limited simply to
authority over persons within the sovereign's realm of power, it is also
authority to deal with other states.
H. Twentieth Century Evolution of the "Sovereign" Actor
A. Sovereignty and the Relationship of the Individual to
International Law
We begin the twenty-first century with discussions of the
"changing face" of sovereignty. Indeed, in the realm of international
law, the face of sovereignty (in the sense of both the relationship of
the state to the individual and the state to the international order)
saw a number of important changes over the course of the twentieth
century. These changes have important implications not only for the
nature of international law at the dawn of the twenty-first century,
but also for the more general relationships we discuss under the
rubric of sovereignty.
As noted above, the origins of the term "sovereignty" dealt with
relationships involving individuals. It was first used to explain the
relationship between the individual and God and then the individual
and the state, providing context for understanding the social order of
Western civilization. It developed to include a context for
understanding relationships between and among states within the
international order, having particular influence on the development
and discussion of the rules governing those relationships. One of the
problems with discussions of sovereignty is that a concept that
developed in response to the need to understand the role of the
individual (the citizen) in society has come to be used to define the
relationship between and among states in international law. Yet even
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
when discussing relationships between states, a continued
understanding of the role of the individual deserves full recognition.
Sovereignty is a concept fundamental to Western understanding
of both domestic and international law. The king-as sovereign-
made, executed, and applied the law in his relationship with his
subjects. When states make law, even law that governs their
relationships with one another, that law has implications for
individuals within those states and for individuals outside those states
who may be affected by those relationships. Thus, any complete
discussion of sovereignty-whether in the domestic or international
context-must continue to deal with the rights and obligations of
individuals as well as with rights and obligations of states.
The twentieth century developments in the relationship between
the individual and international law must both inform and be
reflected in our understanding of sovereignty within the international
legal order. That understanding requires that the term "sovereignty"
be used only when it provides clear meaning of the relationship
between the state and the citizen (domestic law), the relationship
between and among states in the international order (international
law), and the relationship between the individual and international
law. Ignoring any one of these relationships will leave our
understanding of sovereignty incomplete. Most discussions of
sovereignty include the first two of these relationships, even where
those discussions make distinctions between "types" of sovereignty.24
Thus, it is to the third relationship that we now turn, considering
twentieth century developments that have changed the relationship
between states and individuals under international law, and that must
be reflected in our understanding of sovereignty.
Discussing the relationship between the individual and
international law should help demonstrate just when the term
"sovereignty" is properly used in legal and political discussions. It
became common at the end of the twentieth century, for example, to
hear of states "giving up sovereignty" to international organs or to
the "faceless bureaucrats" that might be involved in dispute
resolution systems developed by treaty.25 This assumes a two-tiered
24See, e.g., KRASNER, supra note 22.
2'See 140 CONG. REC. S10,582-$10,591 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1994) (statements of Sen.
Helms, Sen. Thurmond, & Sen. Byrd regarding the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations, made during discussion of Helms' proposed "Sense of the Senate
regarding the need to protect the constitutional role of the Senate").
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social contract approach to international law, under which the
individual relates to the state in domestic law, and only the state
relates to the international legal order in international law. But this
breaks down because there is no "international sovereign," and
because it ignores the fact that individuals also can derive rights and
be the subjects of limitations under international law. Nonetheless,
the international tier of relationships often is described as some kind
of social contract between states similar to traditional Lockean
understandings of the first tier relationship in which individuals agree
to be subjects of the state." Developments in the twentieth century
indicate that this approach no longer is appropriate (and perhaps
never was).
B. Changes in Relationships Affecting Sovereignty and
International Law
1. Changes in Relationships Between and Among States
At least two types of changes are reflected in twentieth century
developments in international law affecting the relationship between
the individual and international law. The first set includes
developments in relationships between and among states that have an
impact on rights and obligations of individuals. The second set
includes situations directly involving the individual in international
legal relationships.
a. The Elimination of the Libert6 de Guerre
The right of a state to settle disputes with other states by going to
war-the libert6 de guerre-was a classic element of sovereignty in
nineteenth century concepts of international law.' Article 2(4) of the
United Nations Charter, in its prohibitions on the use of force,
formally codifies the rejection of this right in the post-World War II
world.' This development, while not directly implicating the
26See, e.g., Henkin, supra note 4, at 1 ("[S]tates are subject to the International Social
Contract, and the end of World War II saw a new social contract in the UN
Charter.").
'See Steinberger, supra note 5, at 407-08,410-11.
28U.N. CHARTER, art. 2, para. 4. The text of this provision reads as follows:
All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or
use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any
state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United
Nations. Id.
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individual, has done much to provide peace and security (the
principal role of the sovereign under traditional political theory). It
thus removes a significant impediment to the sovereign's ability to
seek peace and security on behalf of its citizens, while at the same
time implying limits on the sovereign's ability to engage citizens in
war.
b. Democracy as a Developing International Norm
The last two decades of the twentieth century saw massive shifts
by states to capitalism in the economic realm and democracy in the
political realm. While the first of these shifts presents particular
difficulties in the discussion of international law, it can be argued that
the second has led to normative changes in international law and the
elevation of democracy as a right.29 While this may be more de lege
ferenda than de lege lata at this point, it raises important questions in
any discussion of sovereignty. If democracy is becoming a norm of
international law, then that process must create corresponding rights
for individuals within the international legal system. It is the
individual, not the state, that can claim the right to a democratic form
of government, because that is where the presumed benefits
ultimately lie.
Any shift to democracy as an international legal norm also brings
with it a shift from the sovereign king to the sovereign "we." In the
United States this concept is enshrined in the preamble to the
Constitution, which states that "We the People" have come together
to form a "more perfect union."3 Contemporary democracies are
representative in nature and thus make difficult any discussion of
pure sovereignty in individuals. However, democracy does require
that we think in terms of both a state's relationships with other states
and a state's relationships with individuals.
c. Regional Frameworks as Global Models
International organizations that began primarily for purposes of
"See, e.g., Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86
AM. J. INT'L L. 46 (1992) ("Increasingly, governments recognize that their legitimacy
depends on meeting a normative expectation of the community of states. This
recognition has led to the emergence of a community expectation: that those who
seek the validation of their empowerment patently govern with the consent of the
governed. Democracy, thus, is on the way to becoming a global entitlement, one that
increasingly will be promoted and protected by collective international processes.").
"'U.S. CONST. pmbl.
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economic cooperation have an impact on sovereignty because they
have evolved to levels of cooperation that affect political
relationships. The best example is the European Union, which has
grown from the original European Economic Communities' focus on
trade relationships and tariffs to monetary, political, and security
cooperation.' The creation of a new layer of law above that of the
Member States, particularly when that law has a "direct effect" on
individuals within each Member State,' changes both the
relationships among the Member States and their relationships with
individuals (both citizen and alien). The result is new rights for
individuals arising not from national but from supranational legal
orders. These rights imply corresponding limitations on the conduct
of states in their relations with individuals. Whether we discuss them
in terms of power shifts, federalism, or any other specific rubric, they
have clear implications for any discussion of sovereignty.
d. New Multilateral Mechanisms for Dispute Settlement
Consistent with Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter,
states have turned their dispute resolution efforts to more formal
systems involving legal rules rather than military engagement. The
Permanent Court of International Justice and its successor, the
International Court of Justice, have provided a forum for states to
address conflicts and to seek peaceful settlement of disputes directly?3
The World Trade Organization ("WTO") formalized the GATT
organization that, since the late 1940s, has provided perhaps the most
successful forum for the peaceful settlement of disputes between
states in human history.' The economic disputes settled in the WTO
framework often directly involve the interests of private parties, and
thus have implications for the relationships between states and
individuals as well.35
3'See, e.g., Donato F. Navarrete & Rosa Maria F. Egea, The Common Foreign and
Security Policy of the European Union: A Historical Perspective, 7 COLUM. J. EUR. L.
41 (2001).
'See Ronald A. Brand, Direct Effect of International Economic Law in the United
States and the European Union, 17 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 556-608 (1997).
' 3For information on the International Court of Justice, see http://wwwv.icj-cij.org (last
visited Aug. 5,2002).
'A review of the disputes submitted to the World Trade Organization (WTO) since
its creation in 1995 shows over 240 state versus state conflicts submitted to the WTO
dispute resolution system. See
http://www.wto.orglenglishtratop-e/dispu.e/dispu-e.htm (last visited Aug. 5,2002).
"There are many examples of GATT and WTO disputes that involve important
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
The International Centre for the Settlement of Investment
Disputes ("ICSID")3 6 is perhaps the most striking example of an
international organization set up to provide peaceful settlement of
disputes arising directly between states and individuals. This
formalization of dispute settlement in which individuals may directly
challenge the legality of the conduct of states in their relationships
with individuals provides a good example of how international law
grew in the twentieth century to deal with relationships between
individuals and states.
2. Changes in Relationships Between Persons and States
The second set of relationships reflected in twentieth century
international law developments affecting the relationship between
individuals and international law are those that deal directly with the
relationship between the individual and the state.
a. Applying International Law to Economic Relationships
between States and Persons
The twentieth century has seen new recognition of the direct
application of international law to relationships between individuals
and states. The law of economic relations is one area in which
international law (traditionally considered only applicable between
and among "sovereign" states) has grown to encompass rules that
provide rights for individuals in their relationships with states.
Persons and states entering into commercial relationships have
been allowed to provide explicitly that those relationships will be
governed by international law. Private parties may use the
negotiation process to enter agreements that limit the ability of states
to exercise law-making powers to change the nature of the
contractual relationship. Stabilization clauses in long-term economic
development agreements and other types of contracts are common-
place provisions. These provisions require that the resulting
interests of specific persons (especially legal persons). See, e.g., Ronald A. Brand,
Private Parties and GATT Dispute Resolution: Implications of the Panel Report on
Section 337 of the US Tariff Act of 1930, 24 J. WORLD TRADE 5 (1990) (discussing the
patent dispute between Akzo and Dupont ultimately taken to GATT dispute
settlement).
'6Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and
Nationals of Other States, adopted Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159,
reprinted in 4 I.L.M. 532 (1965) (creating the International Centre for the Settlement
of Investment Disputes (ICSID)).
[Vol. 25:279
2002] Sovereignty: The State, the Individual, and the International Legal System 291
relationships be considered in light of international law, and place
specific limitations on the conduct of the "sovereign" state, even
within its own territory.37
The idea that private parties and states may explicitly choose to
have their relationships governed by international law further evolved
to a recognition that, even if such a choice is not expressly made,
international law is nonetheless applicable to those relationships. "
This has been recognized by states in their treaty obligations, in the
creation of ICSID, and in numerous bilateral investment treaties that
apply international law standards and provide for direct dispute
resolution between states and private parties. 9
b. Applying Municipal Law to Foreign States in National Courts
The dissipation of the absolute theory of sovereign immunity
over the course of the twentieth century means that states have
become increasingly subject to the application of municipal law in
municipal courts. Not only may states explicitly (or implicitly) waive
immunity from suit in national courts, but their involvement in
commercial activity also sheds the cloak of immunity otherwise
available in relationships with individuals.40  Thus, just as private
parties at the end of the twentieth century are more likely to enter
into relationships with states that will be governed by international
law, so are states more likely to enter into relationships with private
parties that will subject them to the application of the municipal laws
of other states.4' In this way, some of the developments of the
"For a good example of this development of the relationship between the individual
and the state, and a decision upholding a clause choosing international law to apply
to that relationship, see Professor Dupuy's arbitral decision in Award on the Merits in
Dispute Between Texaco Overseas Petroleum Company and the Government of the
Libyan Arab Republic, reprinted in 17 I.L.M. 1 (1978).
'sSee, e.g., Arbitration in the Matter of Revere Copper and Brass, Inc. and Overseas
Private Investment Corp., reprinted in 17 I.L.M. 1321 (1978) (arbitrators determined
that a long-term economic development agreement between a private party and a
state was governed by principles of international law even in the absence of a choice
of law clause in the agreement).
9See, e.g., United States 1994 Model Bilateral Investment Treaty art. IX, reprinted in
RONALD A. BRAND, FUNDAMENTALS OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS:
DOCUMENTS 124 (2000).
"See, e.g., Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat.
2892 (1976) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1605) (setting forth the exceptions to
sovereign immunity for states in U.S. courts).
"For a classic example of the application of the commercial activity exception to
sovereign immunity in U.S. courts, see Texas Trading v. Federal Republic of Nigeria,
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twentieth century have actually diminished the distinction between
individual and state in the application of law to their relationships.
c. The Development of Human Rights Norms
This essay focuses primarily on developments in the economic
realm, but it cannot ignore the very significant developments in
international human rights law over the course of the twentieth
century. These developments place significant limitations on the
conduct of states and provide specific consequences if that conduct
should result in the breach of international norms.42
Hobbes considered it a right of the sovereign to punish a subject
who refuses to obey the king. The subject could refuse to obey when
the right of self-preservation outweighed the obligation to keep the
covenant with the king. At the same time, however, the sovereign
retained the right to punish the subject for such refusal. The subject
had "the liberty to do the action for which he is nevertheless without
injury put to death."43 States today are limited by international law in
their treatment even of their own citizens.
Multilateral frameworks for the protection of fundamental
human rights became an important part of international law in the
twentieth century. The European and Inter-American Courts of
Human Rights now apply their relevant conventions in ways that
place clear limitations on the conduct of states toward individuals.
The movement from Nuremberg to the International Criminal Court
demonstrates the international community's willingness to hold
individuals accountable for their conduct when their acts, under color
of state authority, go beyond contemporary legal limits." These
developments represent substantial crystallization of the rights of
individuals in international law found both in treaties and in
customary international law.45
647 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1981).
'These issues are more fully developed in other articles in this symposium.43HOBBES, supra note 16, at pt. II, ch. xxi, [17].
"Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.183/9, reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 999 (1998). Entered into force July 1, 2002.
See http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/romefra.htm (last visited Aug. 5, 2002).4"See, e.g., 2 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §§ 701-703 (1987).
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d. The Re-Emergence of the Lex Mercatoria in New Clothes:
International Law as National Law
The "law of nations" originated in large part from the conduct of
parties engaged in economic transactions across national borders.46
Its evolution then moved from "law" determined and applied by
societies of merchants based upon their own customs, to law
determined by juries of merchants in national courts, to law
determined by national legislatures and judges and applied to
merchants.47 The twentieth century witnessed the return of the
merchant to a significant role in determining the rules applicable to
commercial conduct. National codes have been accompanied by rules
established directly by merchant groups,' and ultimately by the
movement to treaties through which the rules once again become
truly international in nature and context.49  In the process,
"international law" rules are developed specifically for the purpose of
measuring the conduct of private parties. While these rules in most
cases must be brought into the domestic legal system through either
monist analysis or implementing legislation in a dualist system, they
nonetheless reflect a strong movement toward uniform rules and
efforts at uniform application of those rules to economic transactions
that have impact in more than one national legal system. Thus,
private parties participate in the creation and become the subjects of
international legal rules.
3. Implications for the Future
All of these developments indicate the increasing need to apply
rules of the international legal order to relationships between states
and private parties. Thus, to the extent we think of law as the
expression of authority by the sovereign, we must deal with those
relationships in that context. This means that international law must
4'See RONALD A. BRAND, FUNDAMENTALS OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
TRANSACTIONS 8-17 (2000).
OId.
"For example, the International Chamber of Commerce created the Uniform
Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits (UCP) and INCOTERMS. See INT'L
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, PUB. No. 500, UNIFORM CUSTOMS AND PRACTICE FOR
DOCUMENTARY CREDITS (1993); INT'L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, PUB. No. 560a,
INCOTERMS 2000 (1999).
4Perhaps the best example is the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods, Annex I, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/18 (1980), reprinted in
52 Fed. Reg. 6262 (Mar. 2, 1987) and in 19 I.L.M. 668 (1980).
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deal directly with relationships between states and private parties.
I. Conclusion: Sovereignty in the Twenty First Century
Changes in international law, particularly in its application to
relationships between states and individuals, require that we take
great care in the manner in which we use the term "sovereignty."
They also require that we give careful consideration to the origins of
that term, and to the importance of the individual in the term's
development and purpose. We must recognize that the term now
used most commonly to describe relationships between and among
states originated as a concept describing the relationship between the
individual and the state. Any proper discussion of the term must take
into account this relationship. Thus, we cannot discuss the rights and
obligations of "sovereign" states without recognition of the impact
those rights and obligations have on private persons. That impact has
grown substantially over the twentieth century to include the
application of international law directly to relationships between
individuals and states.
Developments in the law governing relationships between states
and private parties have brought private parties into the realm of
international law and states under the authority of national legal
systems. The very significant development of institutional dispute
settlement mechanisms to deal with state-to-state economic and
political disputes, and even with private party-to-state disputes,
further colors contemporary concepts of sovereignty. The
development of binding international protections for individuals,
even against their own states and those representing states, makes
some explanations of sovereignty difficult to apply. The growth of
regional economic organizations into full-fledged political and legal
units has raised questions of who holds what aspects of sovereignty as
it has been traditionally defined.
An improper analysis of such developments carries the risk of
leaving the concept of sovereignty in a state of suspended ambiguity
as we enter a new century. Recognition that international law now
limits the conduct of states in their relationships with individuals is
not a bad thing, nor does it necessarily represent a diminution of the
"sovereignty" of states." It does, however, require a more complete
9'But see, e.g., RABKIN, supra note 1, at 34 ("Global governance, then, does not
threaten to replace the American government, but it does threaten to distract and
confuse and, ultimately, to weaken it.").
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understanding of a state's exercise of sovereign power. Hobbes
justified absolute authority in the sovereign king by the extent to
which that authority was used to enhance peace and security for his
subjects. This remains an appropriate test of the exercise of sovereign
authority today. Thus, if peace and security are enhanced through
relationships that place limitations on the conduct of states, that is not
an emasculation of sovereignty, nor does it involve states "giving up"
sovereignty. It may well be a proper exercise of sovereignty in the
role of the government to provide peace and security for its citizens.
Such developments simply require that we apply more careful
analysis in our considerations of such conduct.

